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Keynote Address:  Commons and Code 
405 
 
Lawrence Lessig* 
 
I want to take an idea from the North and an idea from the 
South, and see how well these two ideas might hang together.  An 
idea from the North—here at Fordham Law School—and an idea 
from the South, way down at NYU Law School and ask, how 
much can we make these two ideas converge? 
First from the South: we live in a property obsessed era–a time 
when we have come to believe that all progress, at root, comes 
from it’s alignment with property.  This is not a Southern idea-this 
is a distinctly Mid-Western, call it Chicago idea.  But it is an idea 
that has overwhelmed our time.  We ride high on a post-cold war 
triumph, convinced that the ills of communism would be remedied 
if only they privatized everything; never pausing to notice that, 
when they did, the problems were not. 
But there is a competing tradition, even within our own tradi-
tion, not against property, but for a certain balance in property.  
There must be private property, no doubt; and in some cases there 
should also be state property.  But the strong balance to private 
property is not state property; the strong balance is the Commons.  
This is the idea we are being reminded of from the South, by NYU 
Law Professor Yochai Benkler in particular, but of course others as 
well.1  We are being reminded of the place that the Commons has 
 
* Jack and Lillian Berkman Professor of Entrepreneurial Studies, Harvard Law 
School.  A version of this Address was delivered on February 9, 1999 at the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal’s Seventh Annual Sympo-
sium: First Amendment and the Media at Fordham University School of Law.  Footnotes 
were supplied by the Journal. 
1. Yochai Benkler is an Assistant Professor of Law at New York University School 
of Law. See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the 
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 360 (1998).  Professor 
Benkler reveals: 
In [Garret Hardin’s] classic statement, the “tragedy of the commons” is a situa-
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had in our past, and of the urgency that we consider its presence in 
our future. 
The Commons—is a part of the real world here and now, that 
we all enjoy without the permission of anyone.  Central Park is a 
Commons: an extraordinary resource of peacefulness in the center 
of a city that is anything but; an escape and refuge, that anyone can 
take and use without the permission of anyone else. 
The public streets are a Commons: on no one’s schedule but 
your own, you enter the public streets, and go any direction you 
wish.  You can turn off of Broadway onto Fifty-second at any time, 
without a certificate or authorization from the government. 
Fermat’s last theorem2 is a Commons: a challenge that anyone 
could pick up; a challenge that Andrew Wiles picked up, and in the 
early 1990s, he thought he had solved it until he saw it on the 
Internet.3  And people on the Net themselves picked it up; and 
played with it, and showed Wiles that he was wrong; and then they 
played with it some more, and then suggested how it could be 
made right, and he then made it right, and after 350 years, the 
proof was complete.4 
The Internet is a Commons:  the space anyone can enter and 
take what she finds without the permission of a librarian or a prom-
 
tion where a resource is shared without rules to allocate its usage.  Under such 
conditions, every individual with access to the resource internalizes the full 
benefit of using whatever part of the resource the individual is capable of using, 
but shares the costs of depletion caused by his or her use with all other potential 
users of the resource. Similarly, the benefits of an individual’s investment in 
maintenance of the resource are shared with all other potential users, while the 
costs of such investments are not. The individual’s private cost-benefit analysis 
therefore leads all users of the commons to make rational personal choices that 
lead them, with tragic determinacy, to lose the resource. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCIENCE 1243 (1968), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 132 (Robert C. El-
lickson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995). 
2. See Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Values of Internet Gov-
ernance, 1999 Sibley Lecture, University of Georgia 2 (Feb. 16, 1999) (transcript avail-
able at <http://cyber.harvard.edu/works/lessig/kent.pdf>) [hereinafter Lessig, Open 
Code].  Pierre de Fermat “scribbled” his “obscure theorem (Xn + Yn = Zn has no non-zero 
integer solutions for N>2).” Id. 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
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ise to pay.  The Net is built on a Commons—the code of the world 
wide web, HTML5 is a computer language that lays itself open for 
anyone to see–to see and to steal, and to use as one wants.  If you 
like a web page, then all major browsers permit you to reveal its 
source, download it, and change it as you wish.  It is out there for 
the taking, and what you take leaves as much for me as there was 
before. 
Open source software is a commons: the source code of at least 
part of, Linux, for example, lies available for anyone to take, to 
use, to improve, to advance.6  No permission is necessary; no au-
thorization may be required. 
These examples of the Commons that we all know give us a 
sense of what the essence of a commons is.  The point is not that 
there is no regulation of access or use.  A park can be closed and a 
street is sometimes.  Ordinary, low-level, content-and-viewpoint-
neutral type regulations are allowed.  But what is not allowed is 
that access to this property, the access to the Commons, be condi-
tioned upon the will of anyone else.  If a Commons is not open for 
others to take without permission of someone, it has lost the es-
sence of being a Commons. 
I list in tedious detail these examples of a Commons, because 
our most likely association with the idea of a Commons is with the 
idea of a tragedy.  The “Tragedy of the Commons”—another idea 
given to us from the South—is the lesson we are most likely to re-
member when we think about the idea of a Commons.7  The prob-
lem with a Commons is that there is no incentive for people to use 
it properly.  Create a commons, and people will overgraze it.  The 
Commons cannot sustain itself; it, like a tragedy, is destined to die 
some horrible death.  And hence, rather than surrounding ourselves 
with these horrible deaths, why not simply move quickly to a 
world where tragedy is not common?  What would it be—the com-
 
5. See April M. Major, Copyright Law Tackles Yet Another Challenge: The Elec-
tronic Frontier of the World Wide Web, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 75, 80 
(1998).  HTML, or Hypertext Markup Language, refers to the language in with Web 
documents are written. See id. 
6. See Lessig, Open Code, supra note 2, at 6 –7 (discussing the growth of the Linux 
Operating System). 
7. See Benkler, supra note 1, at 360. 
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edy of private property, rather than the “Tragedy of the Com-
mons.”8 
But careless thought here is likely to carry this notion of trag-
edy too far.  For again, if Commons face such an inevitable trag-
edy, how is it that we have so many of them around us?  If tragedy 
is its destiny, how is it that parks and Linux can so dramatically 
flourish as they do? 
I do not want to answer that question.  Alas, it is too hard for 
me.  But I do want to raise the question that Benkler9 types are in-
creasingly pushing.  Can we imagine a world in real space where 
the commons is taken away?10 
Just think about the details of this world for a moment.  
Benkler asks, what if the city decided that sidewalks are a public 
resource that it could auction to raise cash.11  Everyone would have 
a right to the sidewalk just at the entrance of their house, but all 
other access rights to sidewalks would be auctioned to the highest 
bidder.  It is hard to imagine, I know, but leap with me a bit here.  
You might have the right to use Fifth Avenue, or Bleecker, but you 
would not have the right to use Wall Street.  Or you might have the 
 
8. See id. 
9. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
10. See Benkler, supra note 1, at 360.  The absence of commons is a result of the 
“Tragedy of the Commons.” Id.  Professor Benkler, addressing the tragedy of the com-
mons concerning wireless communications, opines: 
It is important to realize that this solution to the tragedy of the commons prob-
lem does not rely on the elimination of excess demand for transmissions over 
the supply of frequency/time/power units available for transmission. It does 
not, in other words, suggest or rely upon the notion that spectrum sharing will 
eliminate spectrum scarcity. It suggests, instead, that just as property rules can 
bring into play the incentives of spectrum owners to maximize the value of 
their spectrum, spectrum-sharing rules can bring into play the incentives of 
equipment manufacturers to optimize the use of spectrum by their devices. . . . 
What is important from the perspective of the tragedy of the commons objec-
tion is that the tragedy can be resolved within the framework of the equipment 
market, and does not require a shift to the spectrum market. Assuming the de-
velopment of appropriate spectrum-sharing rules and protocols, and in the pres-
ence of an equipment market to reward investment in more efficient devices, 
the absence of a property system in spectrum should not result in a tragedy of 
the commons. 
Id. at 361-62. 
11. See Benkler, supra note 1, at 361. 
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right to Wall Street in the morning, but not in the evening.  Or 
Bleecker on the weekends, but not during the week. 
Whatever rights you have, however, are rights you have se-
cured.  For the key idea here is that you have access to the public 
streets only where you have secured permission for access. You 
buy permissions, like you used to buy E tickets at Disney World to 
use different parts of the public streets.  Or, we could imagine 
permission being licensed by the state—allocated according to 
some view in the public interest, or to some idea about how the 
public might be best served.  In either case, the core is the same.  
Access is granted, not guaranteed.  One gets access only with per-
mission of someone else. 
Now, this would be an odd world.  Perhaps it would be a 
wealthy world, a world without deficits, for one imagines the state 
would get lots of money from these auctions.  But it would be a 
world wholly foreign to the world we know now.  So foreign, and 
so impossible to imagine creating, that it is easy for us simply to 
ignore the hypo.  Come down, Professor Benkler, you are living in 
the clouds. 
Enter our idea from the North.  At a conference at Emory (I 
know, that is still the South, but I will get back quite soon) a then-
assistant professor from Fordham, Joel Reidenberg, told the audi-
ence about a new kind of regulator-a new type of regulation, that 
was both more efficient and more pervasive than government.12  
He called this regulator Lex Informatica, but when I heard it I 
could not spell “Informatica,” so I called it simply “Code.”13 
 
12. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Cyberspace Rule-Making, 45 
EMORY L.J. 911, 928 (1996) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Governing Networks ]. Professor 
Reidenberg indicates: 
The overlap of interests between the physical world and the virtual world sug-
gests a governance model that contains distinct rules for the separation of pow-
ers.  Territorial borders will retain an important role in structuring overlaps be-
tween network boundaries and state jurisdictions.  Principles of federalism 
offer a valuable lesson for the relationship between territorial and cyberspace.  
Just as Lex Mercatoria did not displace the law of the situs of trade fairs, a new 
Lex Informatica suggests that sovereign states should only act within particular 
spheres of influence. 
Id. 
13. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:  The Formulation of Information Pol-
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The idea behind Lex Informatica, or Code, is this: what makes 
cyberspace so different is that it is constituted by laws of nature 
that we write.  What defines the experience that cyberspace is a set 
of instructions written into code that we or, more precisely, code-
writers, author.  This Code sets the rules of this space; it regulates 
behavior in this space; it determines what is possible in the space 
and what is not possible.  And as we look to this Code maturing, 
Reidenberg rightly saw that this Code would become its own type 
of law.  That we could define life in cyberspace as we wanted—
with privacy or without; with anonymity or without; with universal 
access or without; with the right to speak freely and publish freely, 
or without.  We could write these freedoms into the code of cyber-
space itself.  Code would then regulate life there.  And the regula-
tion through code, Reidenberg called Lex Informatica.14 
 
icy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 570 (1998) [hereinafter Reidenberg, 
Lex Informatica].  Professor Reidenberg reveals: 
During the middle ages, itinerant merchants traveling across Europe to trade at 
fairs, markets, and sea ports needed common ground rules to create trust and 
confidence for robust international trade.  The differences among local, feudal, 
royal, and ecclesiastical law provided a significant degree of uncertainty and 
difficulty for merchants.  Custom and practices evolved into a distinct body of 
law known as the “Lex Mercatoria,” which was independent of local sovereign 
rules and assured commercial participants of basic fairness in their relation-
ships.  In the era of network and communications technologies, participants 
traveling on information infrastructures confront an unstable and uncertain en-
vironment of multiple governing laws, changing national rules, and conflicting 
regulations.  For the information infrastructure, default ground rules are just as 
essential for participants in the Information Society as Lex Mercatoria was to 
merchants hundreds of years ago. . . . Historically, law and government regula-
tion have established default rules for information policy, including constitu-
tional rules on freedom of expression and statutory rights of ownership of in-
formation. . . . [F]or network environments and the Information Society, 
however, law and government regulation are not the only source of rule-
making.  Technological capabilities and system design choices impose rules on 
participants.  The creation and implementation of information policy are em-
bedded in network designs and standards as well as in system configura-
tions. . . . [T]he set of rules for information flows imposed by technology and 
communication networks form a “Lex Informatica” that policymakers must un-
derstand, consciously recognize, and encourage. 
Id. at 553-55 (citations omitted). 
14. See id. at 571. Lex Informatica has analogs for the key elements of a legal re-
gime: 
Like a legal regime, Lex Informatica offers both customization of rules and in-
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Now, it is almost four years since Reidenberg first started talk-
ing about this form of law, but we are just on the cusp when others 
can begin to get the point he saw then.15  For as the code of cyber-
space is maturing, we are beginning to see just how radically dif-
ferent the world can be given different architectures for this code.  
And we are just beginning to see how important it will be that we 
take a hand in the construction, for there is any number of worlds 
that this great convergence could create.  We should be certain that 
the world it creates is a world we want. 
I want to think about this question of Lex Informatica in rela-
tion to this ideal of the Commons.  For when we put these two 
ideas together—the idea of the Commons and this notion of a 
world built through code—we will see that Benkler’s impossibil-
ity.16  The impossibility of imagining a world without the Com-
mons, is Reidenberg’s reality—the reality of a law that could de-
fine the Commons away as easily as it could define the Commons 
into existence.  We will see that the future of cyberspace could ei-
ther be a world with a Commons or a world without a Commons.17  
And it is important that we choose which world cyberspace will 
become. 
Let me put my cards on the table here.  I am wildly in 
Benkler’s camp.  I think that the Commons is a critical feature of a 
well functioning liberal society.18  And I am also wildly under Rei-
 
alienable rules.  Customization for Lex Informatica occurs through technologi-
cal configurations.  For example, Internet browsers such as Netscape contain 
log files that record the user’s web traffic patterns.  This protocol establishes a 
default rule for the collection of personal data that a user can override by alter-
ing file attributes or by disabling the log feature.  As with legal regulation, 
these customizations through reconfigurations are only possible if the architec-
tural standards support the deviations.  In the case of log files for Internet use, 
reconfigurations can only be effective if the logging feature is designed to col-
lect and store the data on a user’s local disk drive.  If the information is col-
lected and stored directly by the Internet service provider, the user will not have 
the capability to override the default rule.  Lex Informatica can thus have sub-
stantive inalienable rules as a result of architectural decisions. 
Id. at 571-72 (citations omitted). 
15. See Reidenberg, Governing Networks, supra note 12, at 929. 
16. See Benkler, supra note 1, at 360. 
17. See Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, supra note 13, at 570; see also, Benkler, supra 
note 1, at 360. 
18. See Benkler, supra note 1, at 361. 
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denberg’s influence.  I think that the threat to the Commons in a 
world constituted by Code is fundamental.  So I want to sketch 
here just two arguments, and one hint, about how the Commons se-
riously might interact with the culture that is emerging on the Net.  
These two arguments, are built on the topic of the first panel, free 
speech, and hints to the topic of the second—something called an-
titrust. 
There are two places where the convergence of media in cyber-
space presents problems for this intersection of the commons and 
code.  One is in the context of intellectual property; the second is 
in the context of broadcasting, or spectrum allocation. In real 
space, these two worlds have very different conceptions of the 
Commons. 
Intellectual property in real space embraces the idea of the 
Commons quite fundamentally.  Copyright terms are limited; fair 
use is rich; ideas cannot be copyrighted.19  All these combine to 
create a world where intellectual property becomes part of a cul-
tural commons.  The frictions of real space law make it very hard 
to perfectly control the development and use of this real space 
Commons, so that I might have to buy the book in real space.  But 
after I have bought the book, my use of the book—my use of its 
ideas, my criticism of the book, my development of ideas—all 
these are mine, because the intellectual property law, ineffectively 
enforced as it is in real space, in effect puts those ideas and that 
expression into the Commons. 
Broadcasting, in real space, rejects this idea of the Commons.  
Except for weird public access channels, individuals in real space 
have no access to television broadcasting resources.  Even if you 
buy the equipment, you cannot start televising the activities in your 
living room unless you have the permission of a governmental 
agency—the FCC.  Or increasingly, unless you have purchased the 
right to broadcast at an auction sponsored by the FCC. 
Certain necessities in real space makes this so.  It would be too 
hard to perfectly control intellectual property in real space.  The 
 
19. See generally, 3 MELVILLE B NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 16.01 [A] (1998).  “Copyright does not protect ideas, but only the expres-
sion of ideas.” Id. 
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frictions of real space guarantee this.  And it would be too difficult 
to imagine a Commons in broadcasting in real space.  Signals 
would conflict, chaos would reign—and so the mix of Commons in 
broadcasting would mean the destruction of broadcasting.  In both 
contexts, this mix between the Commons and the technology 
seems destined, because nature made it that way. 
But this mix between the Commons in broadcasting, and the 
Commons in intellectual property, is not fixed in cyberspace.  In-
deed, we are increasingly beginning to see the development of 
Code that will make it possible to perfectly control the use of intel-
lectual property in cyberspace.  Researchers, such as Mark Stefik20 
in Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (“PARC”), are developing 
technologies that will make it possible for an owner of intellectual 
property to sell whatever bundle of rights he or she wishes to sell, 
and to control perfectly the use of that intellectual property to en-
sure that the rights sold are consistent with that sale.21  Want to buy 
the right to read a book once, that is one price.  To read it a number 
of times, that is a second price.  To excerpt material and pass it on, 
that is a third price.  To make copies of sections, that is a fourth 
price.  And these technologies-–what Stefik calls “trusted sys-
tems,”22 are being supplemented with an absurdly naïve race in 
contract law to find ways to allow owners of intellectual property 
to add further rights to their collection through the use of shrink-
 
20. Mark Stefik is the Principal Scientist at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center 
Park (“PARK”).  For several years he taught a course on knowledge systems at Stanford 
University.  His textbook from that course, Introduction to Knowledge Systems, was pub-
lished in 1995 by Morgan Kaufmann.  His book Internet Dreams was published by MIT 
Press in 1996. See Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Digital Property Rights Chal-
lenge us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 138 (1997). 
21. See id. at 139. 
22. See id.  Mr. Stefik defines “trusted system” as: 
[A] system that can be relied on to follow certain rules.  In the context of digital 
works, a trusted system follows rules governing the terms, conditions and fees 
for using digital works.  Suppose that you have a digital work stored on a 
trusted system, and you do not have a right to copy the work.  Then, if you ask 
the trusted system to make a copy, it simply will not do it.  Instead, it will give 
you an error message.  If you do have a right to copy and, for example, exercis-
ing the right requires paying a fee and certification that you are over [eighteen] 
years old, then the trusted system would first make sure that the conditions are 
satisfied.  Only then would it make the copy. 
Id. 
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wrap licenses.  The Code, and the law, then, is moving to a place 
where the owner gets to control the use of intellectual property per-
fectly. 
Now this change, taken to an extreme, would essentially de-
stroy the Commons in intellectual property.  Copyright would not 
expire, IP would not fall into the public domain, fair use would not 
be guaranteed, because the Code could essentially eliminate it.  
The world of IP would move into a world of perfect property.  Lex 
Informatica would construct intellectual property without the 
Commons that exists for intellectual property right now in real 
space. 
Meanwhile, a very different change is happening in the context 
of broadcasting.  Broadcasting rights in the United States are, in 
essence, controlled just as they were controlled in 1927.  In 1927 
Congress passed the Radio Act.23  The Radio Act gave the gov-
ernment the right to allocate spectrum to broadcasters.24  This ini-
tial allocation was by licensing—licensing both equipment and its 
use, so, in effect, licensing spectrum.  This licensing was to be un-
der a public interest standard, and it was this public interest stan-
dard that attracted the most vicious criticism.  There was no need 
to allocate spectrum using licenses economists such as Coase ar-
gued. It would be much more efficient simply to auction licenses. 
25  By “propertizing” the radio waves, we could assure that this 
property was devoted to its highest and best use.  And no govern-
mental agency would be hanging around waiting to revoke some-
one’s license because they had angered some bureaucrat. 
But the technology of broadcasting has not stood still since 
1927, even if the technology of government regulation has essen-
tially stood still.  Instead, there has been an extraordinary change—
technologists will say “in degree”; but, as a lawyer let me say a 
change “in kind,” in the available technologies of broadcasting.  
 
23. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communica-
tions Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). 
24. See id. 
25. See Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON 1 
(1959) (generally discussing the rise of the FCC and the feasibility of auctioning licenses 
as a more efficient means of distribution). 
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This is the emergence of technologies such as spread spectrum.26  
With spread spectrum technologies, spectrum would not need to be 
allocated, in the sense of giving one person an exclusive right to 
the detriment of all others.  With spread spectrum, broad swaths of 
the radio spectrum could be available for any to use, so long as 
they were using an approved broadcasting device.  Spectrum 
would become a Commons, and its use would be limited to those 
who had the proper, or licensed, equipment. 
Now, the details of this technology are complicated.  And for-
tunately, I do not have enough time to sketch them, because they 
are even too complicated for me.  But the important thing to see is 
how this technology enables this Commons. 
Compare transportation: when you have railroads, it makes 
sense to allocate the right to use a bit of railroad track at a given 
time.  A centralized coordinating system is, in a sense necessary.  
And no doubt one might improve on that coordination by selling or 
auctioning the right to a certain track at certain times. 
But in a world of highways or sidewalks or parks, it makes no 
sense at all to construct a governmental agency to allocate the right 
to use the roads.  The government might well inspect cars, to make 
sure they are safe and do not pose a risk to others.  But beyond in-
specting equipment, the government has no business controlling 
access.  Once the roads are open, anyone should be allowed to use 
them to go wherever they want to go today. 
Spectrum then would be just like our use of cars today.  Just as 
with the Internet today, anyone, in essence, could become a broad-
caster, because the system would coordinate this broadcasting.  Al-
location decisions would get coded into the Lex of transmitters.  
Smart transmitters would then replace the FCC’s allocation. 
 
26. See Engineering and Technology Action Commission Amends Rules Regarding 
Spread Spectrum Transmitters, 97 FCC REP. 5 (1997), available in 1997 FCC LEXIS 
1734.  Spread spectrum communications systems use special modulation techniques that 
spread the energy of the signal being transmitted over a very wide bandwidth. See id.  
The information to be conveyed is modulated onto a carrier frequency by a conventional 
technique such as AM, FM or digital, and the bandwidth of the signal is deliberately wid-
ened by means of a spreading function. See id.  Such spreading reduces the power density 
of the signal at any frequency within the transmitted bandwidth, thereby reducing the 
probability of causing interference to other signals occupying the same spectrum. See id. 
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Thus, in the one case, intellectual property—the emerging 
Code is undermining the Commons in IP.  In the other case, broad-
casting—the emerging Code is making a Commons possible.  
Code then seems neutral between the Commons and private prop-
erty.  Code could enable either. 
But the lesson we need to see is that our tradition is not neutral.  
We may not have had the opportunity before to architect away the 
Commons fully in the context of intellectual property.  We might 
now, for the first time, have that chance.  But it is not the case that 
our tradition supported the commons merely because it was neces-
sary.  Indeed, I suggest that the First Amendment expresses a very 
strong bias on this question.  Between an architecture of speech 
that allocates the right to speak to those who hold license, and an 
architecture of speech that allocates the right to speak to anyone, 
our tradition favors anyone.  And between an architecture of intel-
lectual property that gives holders of IP a perpetual right to control 
their expression, and an architecture of IP that gives holders an ex-
clusive right “for a limited time,” our tradition favors a limited 
time.  In the context of speech, in a world where we can select 
among the architectures of speech, the values of universality and 
equality demand the preservation of a Commons.  In the context of 
IP, we give property rights to create sufficient incentives so people 
will produce.  But once those incentives are created, what they 
produce becomes part of the Commons.  And in the context of 
broadcasting, we give licenses only where necessity demands.  
When that necessity abates, we should return the right to speak to 
the world the framers knew—where just about anyone could be-
come a publisher, and express whatever views they wished.  In nei-
ther context is it our tradition to give over complete control to an-
other.  In both contexts, it is our tradition to leave as much as 
possible within the Commons. 
Those are the ideas in the context of free speech that this con-
vergence here will lead us to make a choice about the extent to 
which the commons will continue to be supported.  I promised a 
hint about antitrust. 
It seems to me that the same question gets raised in the context 
of antitrust in cyberspace.  Again, the point is not that private 
property is theft.  The point is not an extreme, that we can have 
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only the Commons in cyberspace.  The point instead is a balance 
that is to be struck between the space in cyberspace that functions 
as the streets in real space do, and the space in cyberspace that 
functions as private property does.  A balance between the open 
and closed, between the parks and the backyards, between the 
streets and driveways.  The balance is between one part of the 
Commons held openly and publicly, and another held privately.  
And the challenge for antitrust law is to imagine an analog to these 
real-space challenges.  When the Operating System (“OS”) defines 
our world, as Reidenberg reminds us that it does,27 what are the 
constraints of the Commons that should operate with that OS? 
These questions demand an answer, but as befits a comment on 
the Commons, let me end with an argument about why we seem so 
uniquely disabled from providing an answer.  These choices about 
a balance between private and Commons requires a choice.  The 
invisible hand will not make that choice.  The invisible hand will 
take us to one solution or another.  It seems to me more likely to 
take us to a solution that rejects the tradition of the Commons.  But 
the world where the Commons is an option is a world where we 
should choose which option we want.  An IP that preserves the 
space for the Commons, broadcasting that preserves a space for the 
Commons, or a world that eliminates the Commons.  We have a 
tradition that tilts us one way, but at least we should make a 
choice. 
But though collective judgment here is needed, we have be-
come peculiarly unable to make a collective choice.  We shun the 
idea of government doing anything about this.  We embrace the 
idea of privatizing this problem to make it go away. 
At a conference I was at in the former Soviet Republic of 
Georgia, sponsored by some idealistic agency of Western democ-
racy, an Irish lawyer was explaining to the Georgians what is so 
great about a principle of judicial review—the idea that an act of 
parliament can be struck down by the court.  Said the lawyer: “this 
is just wonderful, the system of judicial review.  Every time an act 
of the parliament is struck down, the people align themselves with 
the court and against the parliament.”  A friend of mine, a democ-
 
27. See Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, supra note 13, at 578. 
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rat Georgian, was puzzled by this description, and so he asked: 
“now, why is it in a democracy that the people naturally align 
themselves with the non-democratic institution, and they are re-
pulsed by the actions of the democratic institution?”  You just do 
not understand democracy, said the Irish lawyer in response.  De-
mocracy for us is not to trust the acts of our democratically elected 
representatives. 
Now, we are like the Irish, though maybe worse, because I do 
not think we have some deep faith in our court.  But we are like the 
Irish in that we, too, indulge this self-indulgent “anti-
governmentalism.”  We have lost the ideal that there is a role for 
government to play here.  Especially we—who spend too much of 
our time using electrons to interact; we who still stand amused at 
the potential of this new world; especially we, who cannot remem-
ber a time when there was not an underbelly to every story about a 
hero.  We are the children of David Lynch, who cannot help but 
believe that just underneath the surface of this beautiful and pris-
tine world there is simply decay.  We listen to the promises of our 
governors no differently than the Soviets listened to the promises 
of their governors.  We, like the Soviets, have heard it all before.  
“Hope” for us is not a place.  “Hope” was a television commercial. 
This, I want to argue, is a pathology.  When government steps 
aside, it is not as if nothing takes its place.  When governments 
disappear, it is not as if paradise prevails.  It is not as if private in-
terests have no interests, as if private interests do not have ends 
that they will pursue.  To push the anti-government button is not to 
teleport us to Eden.  When the interests of governments are gone, 
other interests take their place.  Do we know what those interests 
are?  And are we so certain they are better? 
As we cower, ostrich-like, to avoid making choices, this con-
vergence is making the choices for us.  For the problems of con-
vergence are not technological.  The technicians will give us any-
thing we want.  But the problems of convergence are political—
that we live in an era where even to say there is a role for govern-
ment, or a role for collective choice about what the future in coun-
try will be, is to open yourself to ridicule. 
And so the ridiculous will learn to be silent.  And the techni-
cians will learn to supply what the invisible hand wants.  And we 
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will watch, or at least some of us will watch, as this tradition of our 
liberal past—this ideal of a Commons where we need not live 
Oliver Twist-like, ever begging the powerful for the permission to 
access to our culture and its tradition—will pass into the past and it 
will be no part of this future that cyberspace will be.  That is the 
fear that convergence presents, that we no longer have the power to 
make the choice about whether this world and its values will be 
carried into that world, and define its values, as well. 
 
